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The Republic of Korea and the Middle East: 
Economics, Diplomacy, and Security
by Alon Levkowitz
South Korean–Middle Eastern relations have been ne-
glected in the literature throughout the years, mainly owing 
to the focus on Korea’s relations with the United States and 
Asian states and the attention given to the North Korea–
Middle East military trade. This paper sheds new light on 
this issue by analyzing South Korea’s Middle East policy. 
Until the 1960s, the Middle East was of low importance 
to South Korea because of Korea’s lack of economic and 
political interest in the region. The Cold War division 
dictated with which Middle Eastern countries Seoul could 
trade and establish diplomatic relations, but within these 
boundaries it was South Korea’s developing economy that 
defined the policy toward the region and the importance 
of the Middle East to South Korea.
Since the mid-1970s, the economic importance of the 
Middle East to South Korea’s economy has increased 
gradually along with Korea’s increased importance to 
several Middle Eastern nations.
The economy influenced Seoul’s sensitive policy toward 
Israel throughout the years. Although South Korea’s 
economic involvement in the region increased over the 
years, its diplomatic and military policy toward the region 
was very restrained and limited until the 1990s. The new 
millennium heralded a change in South Korea’s involve-
ment in the Middle East. Its economic involvement now 
includes major nuclear energy projects. For the first time, 
Seoul also became militarily involved in the Middle East, 
including sending troops to Iraq and Lebanon, and it began 
to play a more active political role in the region, which 
might increase further if Seoul decides to become a more 
dominant player in the region. These changes will have 
implications on Seoul’s policies beyond this region.
Historical Connections: 1950s–1960s
Until the 1960s, Seoul’s policy toward the Middle East 
could be defined as passive, if not unimportant, owing to 
Korea’s lack of interests in the Middle East. During the 
first years after its establishment in 1948, South Korea was 
preoccupied with nation building. The Korean War, which 
erupted two years later, left South Korea with one main 
goal, rebuilding the nation and developing its economy. 
In the first decade after the war, the lengthy reconstruction 
of the country left the Middle East out of South Korea’s 
scope. Even during the 1960s, the Middle East remained 
relatively unimportant to the South Korean economy, as 
evident from the following comparison: The total trade 
(import and export) in the 1960s between South Korea 
and nine Middle Eastern states (United Arab Emirates 
[UAE], Israel, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and 
Saudi Arabia) was $125 million. During the same years, 
the total trade between South Korea and the United States 
was $2,563 million, with Japan $2,696 million, and with 
France $86 million.1 
During those years, South Korea’s diplomatic and political 
relations with the Middle East were part of the Cold War 
division between the pro-U.S. camp, to which Seoul be-
longed, and the pro–Soviet Union camp, to which Pyong-
yang belonged. The Cold War defined for Seoul its trading 
partners in the region and in which countries it could 
establish diplomatic relations.2 In this context, in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the Middle East’s political relevance played 
a role in the competition between Seoul and Pyongyang 
on the legitimacy of Korea, as presented in Table 1. Both 
Seoul and Pyongyang competed for Korea’s legitimacy 
by establishing diplomatic relations with countries around 
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Cosponsorship of North Korea Bi ls in the 
U.S. H use of Representatives, 1993–2009
by Jungkun Seo
(Mr. GILMAN) Mr. Speaker, I rise to voice my 
strong support for H. Con. Res. 213, regarding 
North Korean refugees who are detained in China 
and forcibly returned to North Korea where they 
face torture, imprisonment, and execution. I thank 
the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) for 
bringing this important resolution before us today.
(Congressional Record, H3418, June 11, 2002)
(Mr. PAUL) Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce the 
United States-Korea Normalization Resolution of 
2003. . . , which expresses the sense of Congress 
that, 60 years after the Korean War, the U.S. se-
curity guarantee to South Korea should end, so 
should the stationing of American troops in South 
Korea. I hope my colleagues will join me by sup-
porting and co-sponsoring this legislation.
(Congressional Record, E239, February 13, 2003)
Introduction
Why do some members of the U.S. Congress seek greater 
involvement in U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea, 
while other members do not? This paper closely examines 
the incentives and motivations of members of the House 
of Representatives in sponsoring or cosponsoring bills 
and resolutions addressing issues surrounding North Ko-
rea. When it comes to U.S. foreign-policy making in the 
post–Cold War era, pluralistic and cross-cutting voting 
contexts have emerged for members of Congress. Conse-
quently, lawmakers have increasingly become interested 
in taking and publicizing their foreign policy positions 
through cosponsoring bills and resolutions. Research is 
still scant, however, on the incentives and impacts of co-
sponsorship activities on foreign-policy making. Trying 
to fi ll this gap, this article explores congressional politics to-
ward North Korea policy in the post–Cold War period.
The case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
provides an excellent test of diverse hypotheses of cosponsor-
ship activities by House members. Preventing nuclear prolif-
eration and promoting human rights have become key foreign 
policy agendas for the United States since the end of the Cold 
War. It is widely agreed that Pyongyang continues to be one 
of the most troubling and provocative regimes with respect to 
nuclear threats, missile threats, and human rights abuses. As a 
rare empirical study of U.S. foreign policy toward North Ko-
rea from the perspective of congressional politics, this article 
analyzes cosponsorship decisions by members of the House of 
Representatives from the 103rd Congress (1993–95) through 
the 110th Congress (2007–09).
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I offer a brief overview of 
how the end of the Cold War changed U.S. foreign-policy-mak-
ing processes, emphasizing new voting contexts for members 
of Congress concerning the issues of human rights and nuclear 
nonproliferation. Then the existing literature on bill cosponsor-
ship and its impacts on the congressional politics of U.S. for-
eign policy toward North Korea is reviewed. After proposing 
several hypotheses about members’ reasons for cosponsoring 
North Korea bills and resolutions, I use logistic regression anal-
ysis to test what determines House members’ cosponsorship of 
bills addressing U.S. foreign policy toward the DPRK.
Bill cosponsorship proves to be a valuable tool for House mem-
bers who have high stakes in the issues of human rights, reli-
gious freedom, and nuclear nonproliferation. This is particularly 
true when those types of legislation do not come to the fl oor for 
up-or-down votes for fi nal passage.1 Indeed, bills in Congress 
that address North Korea have rarely reached the stage of fl oor 
voting. Empirical fi ndings reveal that the cosponsorship deci-
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the world. Seoul was able to establish diplomatic relations 
with pro-U.S. nations such as Jordan, Iran, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, and Tunisia and a decade later with several more 
Middle Eastern states. Pyongyang established diplomatic 
relations with the more radical pro-Soviet nations such as 
Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and others.
Years later, Seoul established diplomatic relations with the 
Middle Eastern and North African nations that were not 
part of the pro-U.S. camp, such as Yemen (North Yemen 
in 1985, South Yemen in 1990) and Sudan in 1977. South 
Korea did not establish diplomatic relations with Syria on 
account of Syria’s objection to South Korea’s diplomatic 
relations with Israel, but this did not prevent the two 
states from trading with each other. The Middle East was 
not a unique case in the North–South Korean battle for 
legitimacy. Both states competed for legitimacy in other 
regions as well. North Korea set its sights on the “third 
world” and the non-aligned nations in Asia while South 
Korea searched for legitimacy with Japan, anticommunist 
states, and pro-U.S. states.3 
The 1970s
The 1970s symbolized the change in South Korea’s foreign 
economic policy toward the Middle East. Korea’s develop-
ing economy required foreign markets in order for Korea 
to sell its products and services, and Korea changed its 
economic policy toward the region. President Park Chung-
hee (1963–79) invested his main efforts in developing the 
South Korean economy to strengthen the country against 
North Korea and also reduce its dependency on the United 
States for its security and economic development in the 
short term. Park sought to pursue a more independent 
Republic of Korea that in the long term would not be 
dependent on the United States for its economic develop-
ment and security.4 The development of the South Korean 
economy and the rise of the South Korean business con-
glomerates (chaebol) increased the need to find projects 
and markets outside of South Korea. The Middle East 
was seen as a potential target for the expansion of South 
Korean construction companies such as Hyundai, Dong 
Ah Industrial, and Daewoo and a vital source of energy for 
Table 1: South Korea’s and North Korea’s Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1950s–80s
Country
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s
E C T E C T E C T E C T
Bahrain S
Egypt S S,N
Iran S N
Iraq N S
Israel S
Jordan S N
Kuwait S,N S,N
Lebanon N S S
Libya N S S
Oman S
Qatar S
Saudi Arabia S
Sudan N S S
Syria N
Tunisia S S N
Turkey1 S
United Arab 
Emirates
S
Yemen (North) Arab 
Republic
N
Yemen (South) 
People’s Democratic 
Republic
N
Source: R. D. McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, “A Precarious Balance: Korea and the Middle East,” Korean and World Affairs 8, no. 2 
(1984): 238. 
1 Turkey was the only Middle Eastern nation to send forces to the Korean War. 
Note: E-embassy; C-consulate; T-trade mission; N-North Korea; S-South Korea; this table shows the dates that each individual office 
was established.
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South Korea. South Korean construction companies were 
the dominant South Korean companies in the region, but 
other Korean companies sold their products in the Middle 
East: Hyundai, for example, sold Pony cars in the Middle 
East,5 and South Korea communication equipment com-
panies made market inroads there as well. Between 1974 
and 1982, South Korea companies captured 49.2 percent 
of the network cables sales market in Saudi Arabia.6 
In the early 1970s, the face of the Middle East changed 
when the oil boom brought a rapid increase in revenues to 
oil-producing nations. This led these countries, mainly in 
the Middle East, to launch ambitious programs of public 
spending on infrastructure to foreign companies. The 
1970s oil boom opened opportunities for South Korean 
companies to expand to the Middle East and compete with 
other international companies. Seoul began to regard this 
region as an attractive market for its industries, mainly the 
construction companies. The main goals of the government 
and the chaebol were to increase the competitiveness of 
South Korea’s economy and South Korean chaebol and 
to overcome the conception that South Korean companies 
were incapable of competing in international projects.
The increased trade between South Korea in the Middle 
East is noticeable when comparing trade in the 1960s 
and 1970s. As Figure 1 shows, the total trade in 1965–69 
between South Korea and the UAE, Israel, Iraq, Iran, 
Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia was $125 
million; five years later the total trade had increased to 
$1,826 million, and between 1975 and 1979 it increased 
again to $14,691 million. South Korea’s main Middle 
Eastern trading partner in the 1970s was Saudi Arabia, 
South Korea’s main oil provider, with a total trade of 
$8,780 million.7 
While the developing South Korean economy increased 
the need to improve Seoul’s relations with the Middle 
East to realize Korea’s economic potential, it concurrently 
increased Seoul’s dependence on the Middle East because 
of Korea’s reliance on oil and gas from the region. Figure 2 
and Figure 3 show how important the Middle East became 
for South Korea. South Korea imports about 85 percent of 
its oil from the Middle East. The more developed South 
Korea became, the greater was its dependence on oil and 
gas from the Middle East. This dependency increased the 
advantage—both direct (the oil embargo) and indirect 
(the fear of potential oil embargo)—that Middle Eastern 
countries had over Seoul, especially regarding Korea’s 
policy toward Israel. The October 1973 war and the oil 
crisis of 1973–748 demonstrated to Seoul how great its 
Middle Eastern oil dependency was, the cost of its rela-
tions with Israel, and the complexity and volatility of the 
region.9 The Arab boycott of any company that traded with 
Israel decreased Seoul’s ambition to improve trade and 
diplomatic relations with Israel by opening an embassy 
in Israel, as Israel had done in Seoul.
Israel is a very delicate issue in South Korea–Middle East 
economic relations. Israel was one of the first Middle 
Eastern nations to establish diplomatic relations with 
South Korea (1962) and even sent medical assistance to 
South Korea at the beginning of the Korean War.10 Since 
its establishment, the state of Israel has fought seven 
wars against its Arab neighbors (Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, and Iraq). Its geopolitical location in the Middle 
East and the constant tension between Israel and its Arab 
neighbor states has created complex economic relations 
between Israel and South Korea. The 1967 war between 
Israel and its neighboring Arab countries increased the 
Arab nations’ pressure on Seoul to reconsider its relations 
with Israel. The tension between Israel and its neighbors 
and Seoul’s sensitivity to the Arab states’ reaction to any 
improvement in South Korea–Israel economic and diplo-
matic relations decreased Korea’s incentives to enhance 
its economic and diplomatic ties with Israel. South Korea 
was not the only state that limited its trade with Israel 
Figure 1: South Korea’s Trade with the Middle East, 
1965–79, in millions of dollars
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service.
Figure 2: South Korea’s Sources of Oil in the Middle 
East, 2005 and 2008
Sources: Korea Development Institute (KDI), Korea International 
Trade Association (KITA), Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA), OECD/IEA, Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries: The Republic of Korea: 2006 Review (Paris: 
International Energy Agency, 2006), 89.
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owing to fear of an Arab boycott. Japan faced the same 
fear when it had to evaluate its diplomatic and economic 
relations with Israel.11
Seoul tried to minimize its economic relations with Israel, 
such as by not opening an embassy in Israel even though 
Israel had opened an embassy in South Korea and by 
maintaining low-profile economic and diplomatic rela-
tions that would forestall pressure from the Arab world.12 
Seoul was understandably very sensitive in its dealings 
with Israel, preferring to trade with other Middle Eastern 
nations. One example is Korea’s trade relations with Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, which were—and still are—South 
Korea’s most important trade states in the region, Saudi 
Arabia being the largest oil exporter to Korea and UAE the 
second. These two states used their oil leverage on Seoul 
very effectively: Israeli diplomats were told by South Ko-
rean officials in the 1970s that Seoul would not upgrade 
its trade and diplomatic relations with Israel because of 
Korea’s concern that those Arab nations’ reaction might 
affect trade with Korea.13
In 1978 South Korea was not yet a member of the United 
Nations—an important venue for Israel in those days—
and the Israeli foreign minister decided to close the Israeli 
embassy in Korea. There was limited trade between the 
two states, and the need for budget cuts and Israel’s lack of 
interests in Korea brought about the closure despite objec-
tions from Israeli foreign office diplomats. A short time 
after the closure of the embassy, the Israeli government 
tried to reopen its embassy after realizing that its previ-
ous policy had been a mistake, but it took Israel almost 
two decades to convince the South Korean government 
to allow the reopening of the Israeli embassy in Seoul.14 
Seoul was not willing to allow Israel to reopen an em-
bassy, Israeli diplomats stated, because Koreans feared an 
Arab boycott and the implications that a reopening might 
have on the trade with the Middle East. According to the 
Israeli Ministry of Finance, the Koreans were even more 
subservient to the Arab “central boycott office” than the 
Japanese.15 
To help and support its domestic companies, the South 
Korean government provided both direct and indirect as-
sistance. The government supported Korean companies’ 
projects in the Middle East through loans and tax reduc-
tions, which enabled them to compete with other foreign 
companies in Middle Eastern projects.16 The government 
also assisted the chaebol by persuading the Middle East-
ern states to allow them to build projects in the region. 
When a crisis erupted, such as with the Korean workers in 
Saudi Arabia in the 1970s, the South Korean government 
helped to convince Saudi Arabia to allow the chaebol to 
continue the projects.
From the Middle Eastern states’ perspective, these assur-
ances increased the credibility of the chaebol. The Korean 
chaebol offered Middle Eastern countries experienced, 
cheap labor that could build huge infrastructure projects 
backed by financial support from the Korean government. 
Their ability to build large-scale projects in the Middle 
East made them very attractive. Another advantage that 
the Korean companies offered, which appealed to the 
Middle Eastern nations, was the absence of any perceived 
political agenda or ideological aspirations to influence the 
governments in the Middle East.17
The chaebol began competing for project contracts around 
the Middle East and North Africa and won important 
contracts in these regions. Such projects include the ones 
constructed by Hyundai, Dong Ah Industrial, Daewoo, 
and others.18 Hyundai obtained a contract worth more than 
$900 million for the industrial harbor project in Jubail 
(Saudi Arabia) and an Arab shipbuilding and repair yard 
in Bahrain.19 In 1977, the chaebol built $2.5 billion worth 
of projects in Saudi Arabia. South Korean construction 
projects in the Middle East reached their peak in 1982 and 
constituted 6.6 percent of South Korea’s gross national 
product.20 From 1975 until 1985, nearly one million Ko-
reans worked in the Middle East, mostly in Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain. After the projects ended, they returned to 
Korea.21
The chaebols’ increased need for workers to build projects 
in the Middle East led the South Korean government to 
assist domestic companies by converting military camps 
into chaebol training facilities for new Middle East–bound 
workers. According to Nigel Disney, the South Korean 
government gave additional assistance to the chaebol by 
recruiting most of the workers for these training facilities 
and even offered soldiers an early discharge if they signed 
up for the Middle East.22
Figure 3: South Korea’s Sources of Oil by Region, 
1991–2006, percentage of market share
Sources: Korea Development Institute (KDI), Korea International 
Trade Association (KITA), Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA), OECD/IEA, Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries: The Republic of Korea: 2006 Review (Paris: 
International Energy Agency, 2006), 89.
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The 1980s–1990s
The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War in the 1980s and 
1990s showed the Middle East’s volatility and its instabil-
ity for South Korean companies and investments. On the 
one hand, South Korean companies were doing very well 
in projects throughout the region. An excellent example 
of South Korea’s main construction projects in the Arab 
world during the 1980s was the “great man-made river” 
project in Libya, which aimed to bring water to Libya’s 
desert areas. Dong Ah construction was a South Korean 
company that won contracts exceeding $9 billion to build 
this project.23 The drop in the price of a barrel of oil from 
$48 in 1980 to $12 in 1985 led, on the other hand, to a 
decline of the “oil boom” in the mid-1980s. The reduced 
income in oil-producing states caused by the steep drop 
in the price per barrel of oil caused a cut in the number of 
Middle Eastern building projects offered to foreign coun-
tries, including South Korean construction companies.
The regional wars showed the high risk that the chaebol 
were taking while working in some of the Middle East-
ern countries. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) influenced 
trade between South Korea and both adversaries—Iran 
and Iraq. Trade was not stable throughout the war years, 
and it depended on the battle zones of both states. For 
example, South Korea imported a total of $642 million in 
petroleum products from Iran in 1980. In 1984, imports 
rose to $1,135 million, and by the end of the war (1988) 
Seoul’s imports declined to $518 million. The Iran-Iraq 
War did not prevent South Korea from trading with both 
states. Seoul was not politically identified as supporting 
one of the sides and was able to continue and trade with 
Iran and Iraq during and after the Iran-Iraq War. Diplo-
matic relations between Iran and North Korea and the firm 
alliance between Seoul and Washington did not became an 
obstacle for trade relations between the two states, which 
have grown steadily throughout the years, even during 
the recent Iranian nuclear crisis. While Seoul criticized 
Pyongyang for selling missiles to foreign countries, it 
did not criticize or pressure Iran to halt its military trade 
with North Korea.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war created new opportunities for 
South Korean construction companies to build projects in 
Iraq after the war. Samsung and Hyundai won construc-
tion projects in Iraq, but these projects were halted when 
Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, decided to invade Kuwait. 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion had financial consequences 
for the chaebol and on other foreign companies as well. 
The chaebol were involved in many projects in Iraq, 
which carried the risk of nonpayment because of the war. 
Samsung, for example, was one of the chaebol that, prior 
to the invasion of Kuwait, had begun working on the 
Baghdad-Basra motorway; Samsung was left with a $100 
million debt by the Iraqi government. Another example is 
Hyundai projects for the Housing Ministry estimated at 
$860 million, which the war in Iraq jeopardized.24 Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War exemplified to the 
Korean chaebol that, although the Middle East could 
be very profitable, it could risk all the profits that these 
companies expected to gain. Some of the chaebol hoped 
that after the war they might be able to win reconstruction 
projects in Iraq to overcome the losses in the war.
Although Israel did not participate in the first Gulf War, the 
war had implications for South Korean–Israeli relations. 
Seoul, because of its expectations of winning projects in 
Iraq, was very sensitive about upgrading its economic 
ties with Israel after the Gulf War. Enhancing diplomatic 
relations with Israel might raise doubts among the Arab 
Middle Eastern nations that would ultimately prevent 
South Korea from securing projects or lead to a revival 
of the Arab boycott.25 
In the early 1990s, the Oslo peace process between the 
Palestinians and Israel and, later, the Israel-Jordan peace 
process paved the way for the change in South Korea–
Figure 4: South Korea’s Imports from the Middle 
East, 1991–99, in millions of dollars
Sources: Korea Development Institute (KDI), Korea International 
Trade Association (KITA), Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA), Korea Custom Service, and Korean Statistical 
Information Service.
Figure 5: South Korea’s Exports to the Middle East, 
1991–99, in millions of dollars
Sources: Korea Development Institute (KDI), Korea International 
Trade Association (KITA), Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA), Korea Custom Service, and Korean Statistical 
Information Service.
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Israel relations. The improved trade between the two states 
can be seen in Figure 4 and Figure 5. The fear of an Arab 
boycott that might have prevented the chaebol from work-
ing in Middle Eastern states decreased. The political and 
economic environment in the Middle East was perceived 
as very positive, and Israel was seen as a potential low-risk 
economic market for Korean companies. The chaebol no 
longer feared trading publicly with Israel and the rest of 
the Middle Eastern states.
The figures show that the increased trade between Israel 
and South Korea did not harm South Korea’s trade with 
the Arab Middle Eastern countries. The Oslo peace process 
and the visit of the Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, to 
Korea in 1994 broke the ice and led to improved economic 
relations between the two states. Hyundai was the first Ko-
rean company to open a branch in Israel in 1994; Daewoo 
and LG opened their branches in 1999, and other Korean 
companies came later. In 1988 the total trade between 
Israel and South Korea was only $90 million. Seven years 
later, in 1995, the total trade increased to $690 million. At 
the end of the 1990s, the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to 
concerns in the Middle East regarding the credibility of the 
chaebol. South Korea was able to quickly overcome the 
1997 financial crisis, however, and South Korean compa-
nies continued to secure projects in the Middle East with 
minor effects on a few Korean companies whose economic 
recovery was under question.26 
Until the 1990s Seoul did not use its economic power to 
play a role in the peace process between Israel and Syria 
or with the Palestinians. Reasons for this included the 
dominant role that the United States and the European 
Union played in the Middle East peace process and the lack 
of interest of the Middle Eastern states in Seoul’s politi-
cal involvement. Tokyo, for example, supports regional 
projects that will allow it to influence the peace process, 
but Seoul has not initiated similar projects. One could say 
that Seoul did not see itself or aspire to be seen as a politi-
cal player in the region. The Oslo peace process enabled 
different countries such as South Korea to get involved 
in projects encompassing confidence-building measures 
without the fear of paying any price for cooperating with 
both Israel and its neighbors.
In this context, Seoul decided to use its economic power 
to contribute to the peace process by supporting projects 
in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). According 
to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Seoul invested more than $10 million in the PNA 
between 1994 and 200527 and continues to grant funds for 
PNA projects. Compared with other states such as Japan 
(direct assistance of $197.7 million during 1993–2004) 
and Germany ($190 million during 1994–2005), South 
Korea’s financial assistance to the PNA is very limited, as 
is its political involvement in the peace process. Seoul is 
systematically attempting to convince the regional players 
that it is interested in a more active political role in the 
region, primarily in order to be perceived as a political 
and economic middle-power state. This process is in its 
primary phases, and it will require further efforts from 
Seoul if Korea wants to be seen and treated as an influential 
player in the region. It seems that for the time being Seoul 
prefers its current status in the region.
The New Millennium
The new millennium presented another step in the upgrade 
of South Korea’s Middle East economic policy (Figure 
6 and Figure 7). South Korean companies continued to 
win projects in the region: Hanwha won contracts worth 
$1 billion in Saudi Arabia;28 Hyundai Engineering, GS 
Engineering, and Hyundai Heavy Industries won contracts 
for $3.9 billion in the UAE; and Korean companies won 
projects in Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries. 
But the most important achievement of South Korea’s 
trade relations with the Middle East, with far-reaching 
implications, was the nuclear power project in the UAE. 
Figure 6: South Korea’s Imports from the Middle 
East, 2006–09, in millions of dollars
Sources: Korea International Trade Association (KITA), Korea 
Development Institute (KDI), Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA), Korea Custom Service, and Korean Statistical 
Information Service.
Figure 7: South Korea’s Exports to the Middle East 
2006–09, in millions of dollars
Sources: Korea International Trade Association (KITA), Korea 
Development Institute (KDI), Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA), Korea Custom Service, and Korean Statistical 
Information Service.
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Seoul surprised the world in 2009 when it won the $40 
billion UAE nuclear power contract.29 The French com-
panies were certain that they had secured the contract, 
but South Korea was able to overcome the obstacles and 
win the contract. Even President Lee Myung-bak assisted 
the South Korean companies by visiting the UAE prior 
to the decision to convince the UAE to give the project 
to the Korean companies. This is the largest contract ever 
won by South Korean companies abroad. The market for 
nuclear power plants, which, according to forecasts, will 
double in the next two decades, was controlled until now 
mainly by the United States, France, Japan, Russia, and 
China. The South Korean nuclear power project in the 
UAE establishes South Korea’s position as an important 
nuclear power plant supplier and opens the door for po-
tential projects worldwide.
The Jordanian and Turkish governments are already ne-
gotiating with Korea on building nuclear power plants. 
The UAE project also helps the South Korean economy to 
diversify the products and services it exports worldwide. 
Korea also signed an agreement with the UAE to transfer 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other technologies30 
and is also negotiating with the UAE, Iraq, and other 
Middle Eastern states regarding the sale of South Korean 
T-50 Golden Eagle trainer jets. The UAV agreement and 
the T-50 negotiations demonstrate Seoul’s increased eco-
nomic involvement in the region, not only in the civilian 
economic arena but also in the security arena.
To upgrade its economic relations with the region, 
President Lee Myung-bak’s government is considering 
signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman. These 
FTAs demonstrate the change in Seoul’s policy toward 
the region. Seoul was no longer interested only in FTAs 
with Washington and other Asian nations; it now viewed 
the Middle East as an important market. The economic 
improvement was not limited to the Arab Middle Eastern 
nations. South Korea improved its economic relations with 
Israel as well. Trade between the two states increased from 
$90 million in 1988 to $690 million in 1995; it peaked in 
2008 at $1,922 million.31 In addition, South Korea is in 
the preliminary stages of evaluating an FTA with Israel. 
The normalization between Israel and some of the Arab 
states such as the Gulf Cooperation Council dissolved 
South Korean fears that the Arab states might perceive the 
economic and diplomatic relations between South Korea 
and Israel as a breach of the Arab boycott. Israel was no 
longer perceived as an obstacle to their business with the 
Arab Middle Eastern nations.
The new millennium presented another change in South 
Korea–Middle East relations. For the first time, Seoul 
became militarily involved in the region as part of the 
UN peace forces. North Korea’s long-standing military 
cooperation with several Arab states was and still is more 
prevalent in the region than South Korea’s32  however.
In the first Gulf War in 1991, Washington pressured Seoul 
to send forces to participate in the war. Seoul was not 
inclined to send forces to Iraq but understood that the 
alliance with the United States included a price tag that 
Seoul needed to pay, even if it did not want to send forces 
to battle-zone locations. Seoul’s eventual participation 
was limited to 314 people who worked as medical and 
transportation support.
Historically, Seoul took part in a meaningful way in a war 
outside its borders only in the Vietnam War. South Korea’s 
different reaction to U.S. calls for military participation 
can be easily explained: the Vietnam War occurred in the 
midst of the Cold War, and President Park Chung-hee 
was eager to participate. He saw the participation of the 
Korean forces as part of the war against communism, as a 
means to sustain the alliance with Washington. He was also 
interested in the foreign income that the 300,000 soldiers 
and Korea received from the United States in return. The 
Gulf War occurred after the Cold War ended, and Seoul 
was not as enthusiastic about taking sides. Seoul did not 
perceive the Gulf War as a war that it should fight, as it had 
in Vietnam, and the financial need for economic assistance 
did not exist as it had during the Vietnam War.
Seoul’s second participatory role in a military operation 
in the region was assumed under heavy pressure from 
Washington to send forces to Iraq in 2003. Washington 
was no longer willing to accept South Korea’s limited 
involvement in Iraq as it had in the previous war. In 2004 
Seoul decided to dispatch 3,500 South Korean soldiers to 
Iraq. Although the South Korean forces were not in a battle 
zone, they were present in Iraq while the low-intensity 
conflict continued. The South Korean forces participated 
in civilian projects in Iraq even though Washington would 
have preferred that they participate in the military tasks.
This indicated a change in South Korea’s level of involve-
ment in the region: South Korean military forces, not just 
South Korean chaebol, were now present in the region for 
the first time. Seoul’s reports on the activity of its forces in 
Iraq stressed their civilian activities and not their military 
contribution; Seoul wanted to be perceived in a positive 
manner by the Arab world and prevent potentially negative 
influence on its trade in the region.
Seoul’s decision to send forces to southern Lebanon as 
part of the UN peacekeeping forces after the 2006 Israel-
Lebanon conflict33 stands as another example of Seoul’s 
new policy toward the Middle East. The decision to send 
forces to the Middle East is based on the assumption that 
none of the sides of the conflict suspects that Seoul has a 
hidden political or ideological agenda, which makes Seoul 
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political or military arena in which it should get involved, 
as in Asia. This lack of political involvement in the region 
allowed Seoul to trade with most of the Middle Eastern 
states even when states in the region were at war, as the 
Iran-Iraq case demonstrates.
The new millennium demonstrates an incremental change 
in Seoul’s foreign policy, which began in the mid-1990s 
when Seoul gradually increased its involvement in inter-
national organizations in Asia such as the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
and global organizations such as the UN. Seoul’s increased 
involvement pertained to the Middle East as well, which 
led to a subsequent increase in Seoul’s involvement in 
the peace process and sending forces to South Lebanon. 
Seoul’s participation in the region’s political process is still 
in its infancy. If Seoul wants to be perceived as a middle 
power, it should act like one. This has not prevented Seoul 
from increasing its economic involvement in the region, as 
the UAE nuclear power project demonstrates. This project 
will have immense implications on South Korean trade 
with other Middle Eastern nations that perceive Seoul as 
a potential contractor for building these nuclear power 
plants in other regional states and in regions outside the 
Middle East as well.
The Iranian nuclear crisis is Seoul’s biggest future chal-
lenge. If the Iranian nuclear crisis peaks and significant 
sanctions are imposed on Iran, or if the situation dete-
riorates further, Seoul will have to take a stand and deal 
with the implications this crisis will have on its trade and 
investments in the region. From Seoul’s point of view, an 
Iranian crisis might have additional implications if Pyong-
yang perceives the escalating Iranian crisis and the UN 
Security Council response as a threat to its security and 
decides to escalate the tension on the Korean peninsula. 
This link between Iran and North Korea, and the U.S. 
pressure to increase sanctions on Iran, will be part of the 
equation that Seoul will need to consider in the future.
Notes
1 Korean Statistical Information Service, www.kosis.kr/eng/index.
html.
2 B. K. Gills, Korea versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 64–65.
3 Ibid., chaps. 3, 4.
4 Kim Hyung-A, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee 
(London: Routledge, 2004).
5 Frédérique Sachwald, Going Multinational (London: Routledge, 
2001), 227.
6 Technology Transfer to the Middle East (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1984), 195.
7 Korean Statistical Information Service; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.
a perfect candidate for participating in a peace force in 
the Middle East. The change in South Korea’s military 
involvement policy in the region and beyond is evident in 
the statement of Colonel Kang Chan-ok, chief of the South 
Korean forces in Lebanon: “We will continue our efforts 
to raise South Korea’s international profile.”34 This change 
in Seoul’s policy coincides with the incremental change in 
South Korea’s broader foreign policy in the last decade, 
as it has gone from a passive global player to a more ac-
tive player, not just on the Korean peninsula but also in 
international organizations and other regions as well.
South Korea’s stand on the Iranian nuclear issue indicates, 
however, that economic considerations still rule Seoul’s 
diplomacy. From the beginning, when the Iran nuclear 
issue was raised in 2003 at a meeting of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Seoul sent calming 
messages to Tehran that South Korea would keep a bal-
anced position. Since then, South Korea’s policy can be 
characterized as following mainly the obligatory sanctions 
imposed on Iran by the UN Security Council while refrain-
ing from voluntary harsh measures toward Iran, as other 
U.S. allies, including Japan, have taken. These voluntary 
sanctions require a political decision to pay an economic 
price for the coordinated international counterprolifera-
tion efforts, a price that Seoul is not ready to pay and not 
required to make.
The tension between Iran and the United States on the 
nuclear issue did not prevent Korean companies such 
as LG, Samsung Electronics, Hanjin Heavy Industries, 
Hyundai, Daewoo Shipbuilding, and others from signing 
billion-dollar contracts with Iran. The amount of trade 
between the two states, mainly South Korean energy 
imports, did not suffer greatly either (Iran has supplied 
approximately 8 percent of South Korea’s oil for the past 
few years). One would have expected a country like South 
Korea, which is under the threat of North Korea’s nuclear 
intimidation, to be more watchful in its stand on the Iranian 
nuclear issue, but Seoul, from its nascent global position, 
sees its economic interest and above all its insistence on 
being a nonpolitical economic partner as more important 
for now.
Conclusion
Relations between the Republic of Korea and the Middle 
East have changed with the passage of time. From a nation 
that was constrained by the Cold War and whose relations 
with the Middle East were limited until the 1960s to only 
a few states, Seoul has increased trade with the region and 
since the 1980s has normalized diplomatic relations with 
all the states in the region except for Syria. Although South 
Korean trade with the region has increased and diversified, 
Seoul’s political and security involvement in the region 
was relatively limited until the last decade. South Korea 
perceived the Middle East as a trade target and not as a 
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